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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Utah State Tax Commission have subpoena 
power to compel the Defendant-Appellant, Clay K. Iverson, to 
appear before it and "give testimony and be deposed concerning 
[mis] assets" which could- be sold to satisfy in whole or in part 
tax warrants docketed against him? 
2. Kas the Subpoena Duces Tecum issued by the Utah 
State Tax Commission against Clay K. Iverscn valid? 
3. Did the district court have jurisdiction to enforce 
tne Subpoena Duces Tecum issued by the Utah State Tax Commission 
against Clay K. Iverson in an Order to Show. Cause proceeding? 
The Defendant-Appellant, Clay K. Iverson, (Mr. Iverson) 
lists nine issues grouped under three headings. The first 
heading Mr. Iverson lists is "Jurisdiction of the State Tax 
Commission", under which are three subsidiary issues. All three 
subsidiary issues, in one way or another, ask whether the Utah 
State Tax Commission has jurisdiction over Mr. Iverson, who by 
self-decree, is a nnon-taxpayern• Brief of Appellant at iv. 
The Petitioner-Respondent,. Utah State Tax Commission, 
(Tax Commission) objects to this Court Ts ccrisideraticn of any 
issues involving the jurisdiction of the Tax Commission — those 
issues listed under Point I of Mr. Iverson's Statement of the 
The .-Tax Commission! s jurisdiction to enter an audit 
deficiency against Mr. Iverson is categorically irrelevant to 
-v-
tnis appeal. Mr. Iverson could have contested the audit 
deficiency but- intentionally chose instead to disregard the 
instructions sent to him on how to appeal an audit deficiency by 
filing a Petition for Redetermination. The Subpoena Duces Tecum 
was not issued until the audit deficiency had become final, the 
tax warrants docketed and the appeal time expired. See Verified 
Petition for Orqer to Show Cause (R-2,3). 
Mr. Iverson thus failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies and cannot now resort to judicial review of that audit 
deficiency for the first time in this Court. See State 
Department oi Social Services v, £iggs, 656. p.2d 998 (Utah 1982), 
and (R-7I) . 
The other issues listed by Mr. Iverson are subsumed in 
the questions noted above. Nonetheless, each issue Mr..Iverson 
raises will be treated in this brief. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISION 
Title 55, Chapter 5: Assessment of Property 
Article 5: Stare Tax Commission 
Section 46: General Powers and Duties 
Zhe powers and duties of the State Tax Commission are 
as follows: 
Subsection (17): 
to examine all recordsf DOOKS, papers, and 
documents relating to the valuation of property of any 
corporation or individual, and to subpoena witnesses to appear 
and give testimony and to produce records, books, papers, and 
documents relating to any matter which the commission has 
authority to investigate or determine. The commission or any 
party may in any investigation cause depositions of witnesses to 
be taken as in civil actions. Any member cf the State Tax 
Commission, its secretary, and such other officers or employees 
as the commission may designate, may administer oaths and 
atfirmaticns in any matter or proceeding relating to the exercise 
of the powers and duties of the commission; 
IK THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
Petitioner-Respondent 
v. 
CLAY K. IVERSON 
Respondent-Appellant 
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ERIEF OF PETITIONER-RESPONDENT 
Case No. 860329 
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Nature of the Case 
The Respondent/Appellant Clay K. Iverson has appealed 
the Finaings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Order of 
Ccnter.pt entered against him by the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup o 
the Tax Court Division of the Third Judicial District Court. 
sr. 4- V 
Course of Proceedinos and Disposition in the Lower Court. 
The Tax Commission dees not agree with Mr. Iverson
this case began at the administrative level on August 14, 1985 
when he was served with a "Notice of Deficiency" for the years 
1^83 and 1SJ84. Mr. Iverson, as noted earlier, refused to file 
"Petition for Redetermination11 of that "Notice of Deficiency". 
(R-60). Accordingly, the deficiency in the amount of $4,656.48 
-1-
including taxf interest and penalty became final by operation of 
as amended. See also: Exhibits 1-6 filed in support of the 
Motion for Summary Affirmance. 
On March 21, 19-86 the Tax Commission issued a Subpoena 
Duces Tecum pursuant to section 59-5-56(17) commanding Mr. 
Iverson to appear and give testimony on May 5, 1956 concerning 
his assets that were available or may become available to him to 
satisfy the audit deficiency. Although Mr. Iverson was properly 
served with the subpoena, he failed to appear. Upon petition of 
the Tax Commission, the district court then issued an Order to 
Show Cause on May 8, 1986 ordering Mr. Iverson to appear before 
it and show cause why he should not be held in contempt for. 
failure to honor the Tax Commission subpoena. A hearing was held 
on the Order to Show Cause on May 19, 1986 before the Honorable 
Kenneth Fvigtrup, after which the district court held Mr. Iverson 
in contempt for failure to honor the Tax Commission subpoena and 
sentenced him to thirty (30) days in the Salt Lake County jail. 
The Order of Contempt is dated May 20, 1986. Mr. Iverson 
attained a Stay of Sentence pending appeal of the Order of 
Contempt, after having served ten (10) days in jail. Mr. Iverson 
filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order of Contempt on May 28, 
1986. 
Relief Sought on Appeal 
The Petitioner/Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission, 
seeks on appeal an affirmation of the Order of Contempt entered 
by tne district court against Mr. Iverson. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Tax Commission does not accept Mr. Iverscn's 
"Statement of the Factsn as altogether relevant or accurate. 
In particular, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Mr. Iverson1s 
"Statement of the Facts" which describe Mr. Iverson as a "free 
and natural person", not a "privileged person", and "not a 
taxpayer" are irrelevant, vague, argumentative and self-serving. 
Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 which comment upon the audit deficiency and 
alleged challenges thereto are likewise irrelevant and self-
serving. Paragraphs 7 and 8 are irrelevant, self-serving and 
false, because of the claim that the Tax Commission refused to 
hold an administrative hearing. Paragraphs 10 through 19 are 
reasonably accurate. Paragraph 20 is argumentative and 
irrelevant. Paragraph 21 is reasonably accurate. Paragraphs 22, 
23 and 24 are self-serving, argumentative and false. The record, 
wizh respect to events Mr. Iverson describes in those paragraphs, 
speaks for itself. Paragraph 25 is reasonably accurate. 
Paragraph 26 is misleading and is essentially contradicted by the 
record (R-22, 23). Paragraph 27 is reasonably accurate. 
The .Tax Commission here readopts the Statement of 
M£ ter i c1 Facts as recited in its Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Affirmance. 
- 7 -
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah State Tax Commission had jurisdiction to enter 
an audit deficiency against Mr. Iverson. Mr. Iverson1s arguments 
against tfte Tax Commission's jurisdiction are improperly raised 
before this Court since he intentionally failed and refused to 
exhaust his administrative remedies before the Tax Commission. 
Nevertheless, the case law and authorities are unanimous and 
overwhelming that the compensation Mr. Iverson receives in 
exchange for his services is taxable income. Mr. Iverson thereby 
becomes a "taxpayer" within the meaning of .Utah law because he 
.has taxable income. He is thus subject to the applicable 
statutes and regulations implemented by the Utah State Tax 
Commission. 
Point II 
The Subpoena Duces Tecum issued by the Tax Commission 
was valid. The Tax Commission is empowered under Utah Code Ann, 
§ 59-5-46 (17) to "subpoena witnesses to appear and give 
testimony and to produce records, books, papers and documpnts 
relating to any matter which the tax commission shall have 
authority to investigate or determine." (Emphasis added.) Mr. 
Iverson was admittedly served with the Tax Commission subpoena. 
His presence outside the county of residence may be compelled 
because Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not 
apply to Tax Commission proceedings* 
Point III 
The Tax Court Division of the Third Judicial District 
Court is empowered by case law- and statute to enforce 
administrative subpoenas issued by the Tax Commission. See 
Mayers v. Eronson, 100 Utah 279, 114 P. 2d 213 (1S41); Utah Tax 
Court Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-24-1 through 9 (1953), as 
amended. The district court thus had jurisdiction to find Mr. 
Iverscn in contempt for his retusal to honor the Tax Commission 
subpoena. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The Utah State Tax Commission had Jurisdiction to Enter an Audit 
Deficiency Against the Respondent-Appellant. 
At the outset, the Tax Commission again stresses that 
Mr. Iverscn cannot properly argue before this Court that the Tax 
Commission had no jurisdiction to enter an audit deficiency 
against himf since he failed to raise that issue before the Tax 
Commission. As stated in the Verified Petition, section 59-14A-
78 authorizes the Tax Commission: 
. . . to make the inquiriesr determinations, 
and .' assessments of all taxes (including 
interest, additional amounts, additions to 
the tax and assessable penalties) imposed by 
this act or former acts imposing income 
taxes. 
An audit deficiency was accordingly entered against Mr. 
Iverscn in the amount of ?4,656.48 including tax, penalty and 
interest. £&. The documents showing how the audit deficiency 
was calculated and the correspondence between Mr. Iverscn and the 
Tax Commission are not part of the record below (even though they 
were included as Exhibits attached to Respondent's Motion for 
Summary Affirmance) because the time for appealing the audit 
deficiency had already expired; the deficiency had become final 
and warrants had been docketed in Salt Lake and Utah counties for 
the deficiency amounts. In short4, whatever defects may have 
occurred in calculating the audit deficiency are irrelevant since 
Mr. Iverscn failed to file a Petition for Redetermination 
contesting the audit deficiency. The deficiency is res judicata. 
Recognizing the finality of the audit deficiency 
(docketed as separate tax warrants) the district court 
specifically commented: 
You [Mr. Iverson] have apparently had an 
assessment made against you. You had a 
warrant filed with the clerk of the court for 
the tax which has been assessed, rightly or 
wrongly. If it's inappropriately assessed 
against you, you had an administrative appeal 
or remedies to overcome the tax. If it's 
been assessed against you inappropriately, 
there are judicial appeals, and that!s really 
not the issue before the court. (R-71). 
Thus Mr. Iverson's argument that the Tax Commission has 
no jurisdiction over him because he is a r,non-taxpayer" is 
specious in the extreme. 
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Assuming, however, that the Tax Commissionf s 
jurisiciction is an issue before this Court, Kr. Iverson's serial 
arguments appear to be that (1) the Tax Commission has the burden 
of proving Mr* Iverson is a taxpayer; (2) income taxes must be 
"indirect", as declared by several United States Supreme Court 
opinions decided before 1917; and (3) Mr. Iverson contracts his 
own labor in exchange for lawful compensation and therefore nis 
r.c: a 'taxpayer1 as defined by statute, but . . . a !ncn-
taxpayer' entitled to all the fruits of his labors[,]n which 
cannot be directly taxed. Brief of Appellant at 12-20. 
All of Kr. Iverson's arguments ar.e wrong. In reply to 
Kr. Iverson's first argument noted above, Rule A12-01-l:7g of the 
Tax Commission Rules of Administrative Procedure states that: 
. . . any person seeking exemption from a tax 
statute of general operation will have the 
burden of proof of showing that he is 
entitled to such exemption. In general the 
proponent of any claim, rule or order shall 
have the burden of establishing same. 
This rule is in accord with the generally recognized 
policy tnat assessments are presuir.ed valid until the taxpayer 
cerrcr.strates otherwise. £^e
 f e» c, CclcrfcCO £ Ut&h Ccal Co« v» 
Rorex, 369 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1962). This general rule is 
especially compelling in circumstances such as this where the 
taxpayer simply refuses to comply with administrative procedures 
that afford him a right to contest the assessment. It is Mr. 
Iverson, not the Tax Commission, wno must prove an exemption from 
tax in an appropriate administrative forum. 
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Kr. Iverscn's next argument is tnat income taxes by 
constitutional fiat must be indirect. This argument ignores 
virtually sixty years of law. 
In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 
(1655), upon which Mr. Iverson relies, the United States Supreme 
Court indeed held that a tax upon income produced by real and 
personal property was in effect a direct tax upon the property 
itself. On this basis, the Pollock decision invalidated the 
Income Tax Act of 1894 as violating the requirements of Article 
I, section 2, clause 3 and Article I, section 9, clause 4 of the 
United States Constitution, both of which require that all direct 
taxes snail be apportioned among the states according to 
population. The decision in Ppllock led ultimately to the 
adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, which authorizes federal taxation of income without 
apportionment. See Novak, Constitutional Law 183 (1983). 
On the state level, the Court in New York ex rel. Cohn 
v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937) effectively reversed the Pollock 
rationale by reaffirming the authority under the federal 
constitution of a domiciliary state to tax all income of a 
resident individual irrespective of its source. Novak, supra at 
342. Said the Cohn Court: 
Enjoyment of the privileges of residence in 
the state and the attendant right to invoke 
the protection of its laws are inseparable 
from responsibility for sharing the costs of 
covernment . . . . 300 U.S. at 312. 
-8-
Mr. Iverson's arguments to the effect that the state 
may not tax income are thus an historical anachronism. In 
addition, Mr. Iverson's argument that compensation in exchange 
for services does not constitute income is categorically false 
for tne following reasons: 
1. Both Utah and federal statutes indicate that wages or 
compensation received in exchange for services are included in 
taxable income. 
Utah imposes a tax on state taxable income under section 59-
14A-5. Section 59-14A-11 indicates that the term "state taxable 
income11 for a resident individual means federal taxable income 
(as defined in section 59-14A-10) with certain mocifications, 
subtractions, and adjustments provided in section 59-14A-13-
Federal taxable income, in turn, is that "taxable income which as 
currently defined in Subsections (a) and (b)r § 63, Internal 
Revenue Code" with certain adjustments. IRC section 63 defines 
taxable income as "adjusted gross income" less certain deductions 
(and in some cases, plus an unused zero bracket amount). 
Adjusted cross income is defined in IRC section 62 as "gross 
income" minus certain deductions. Gross income is defined in IRC 
section 61 to mean: 
all income from whatever source derived, 
including (but not limited to) the following 
items: 
(1) : Compensation for services, including 
fees, commissions, and similar items; 
_o_ 
(2) Gross income derived from business; 
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property; 
• • • • 
[4-15 omitted] 
Treasury Regulation section 1.61.1 defines gross in^u^c o~ 
including nall income from whatever source derived, unless 
excluded by law. Gross income includes income realized in any 
form, whether in money, property, or services. 
2. Judicial interpretations of the statutory definitions 
make it clear that wages or other compensation received in 
exchange for services are included in taxable income. 
The United States Supreme Court first defined income in 
Eisner v. Scomber, 252 U.S. 189, 198 (1920), as "the gain, come 
to fruition, derived from capital, from labor, or from both 
combined.n In Ei sner, the Supreme Court determined that the 
distribution of a corporate stock dividend did not constitute a 
gain on an investment, but merely changed the form of that 
investment, id. at 210. 
Subsequently, in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. > 348 
U.S. 426 (1955), the Supreme Court refused to limit the 
definition of income to the Ei sner language. The Court, relying 
on the legislative history behind the enactment of IRC section 
61, held that the definition of income was "based on the 16th 
Amendment and the word !incomer is used in its constitutional 
sense. " X Q . at 432. The Court held that punitive damages 
receivec in a tort action were "instances of undeniable 
accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the 
taxpayers have complete dominion" and were therefore taxable 
income, id. at 431. The Court explained the language of Eisner 
as merely distinguishing gain from capital and held that the 
definition "was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future 
gross income questions." l£. (emphasis added). 
In Gardiner v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 1202 (D. Utah 
157s), atffd. 536 F.2d 903 (10th Cir., 1978), the federal 
district court held that cross income "includes income from 
whatever source derived, unless specifically exempted*" ]j&. at 
1207. In addition, the Tenth. Circuit Court, in Jfpslin v. United 
States, 666 F.2d 1306, 1307 (10th Cir- 1981), held that "tg,]ross 
income certainly includes compensation for services. IRC § 
61(a)(1). If a taxpayer receives property other than cash as 
compensation, the taxpayer1s income is measured by the property1s 
fair market value." 
Mr* Iverson's argument that wages and/or compensation in 
exchange for services are not income was thoroughly discussed and 
rejectee as spurious in Rowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111 
(June 15, 1983). Citing Rice v. Commi .gsioner, 43 T.C.M. 796 
(1^82-129), the tax court specifically rejected the taxpayer's 
argument that wages or compensation are merely an exchange of 
equal value for value. The court quoted from the Rice decision 
as fellows: 
Although the wages received by Kr . Rice may 
represent nc mere than the time-value of his 
work, they are nonetheless the fruit of his 
laborf and therefore represent gain derived 
from labor which may be taxed as income. 
Even if we were to agree with Kr. Ricefs 
contention that wages are, in effect, an 
exchange of equal value for value, he would 
still be taxable upon the wages he and Mrs. 
Rice received in 1978. The general doctrine 
that receipts representing return of capital 
are not taxed does not apply when a taxpayer 
has a*zero basis in the property he exchanged 
for the receipts. Rowlee at 1121-22. 
Every jurisdiction that has decided the issue has held 
tnat wages or commissi ens paid as compensation or in exchange for 
services are taxable income. These jurisdictions include the 
Utah Supreme Court, which decided in State Tax Commission v. 
looney, 696 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1985) , that any other argument is 
"totally without merit." Id. at 1207. See Reading v. 
Commncpioner, 70 T.C. 730 (1978), aff'd. 614 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 
198C); yc-sdale v. Commissioner, 661 F.2d 71 (Sth Cir. 1981); 
Hrntpri States v. Burns, 633 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980); GrfrHZQW v, 
Commissioner, 739 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1984); Olson v. United 
Stetes, 760 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1985). 
Her.ce, Kr. Iverscn is a ntaxpayern within the meaning of 
Utah law because, pursuant to section 59-14A-4(c), he "is subject 
in whole or part to the tax imposed by this act." 
Point ii 
The Administrative Subpoena was Valid. 
Mr. Iverson argues under Point II of his brief that the 
administrative subpoena was not valid because (1) two subpoenas 
were issued — the second subpoena being an alleged forgery; and 
(2) the administrative subpoena can be issued under section 59-5-
46 (17) only to subpoena a "witness", and Mr- Iverson, again by 
self-decree, is not a "witness". Erief of Appellant at 20-25. 
Mr. Iverson fs first argument is improper because £>£ has 
the burden of proving fraud if he maintains that the second 
subpoena was a forgery. £ee gig, Mikkelson v. Quail Valley 
Fealty, 641 P.2d 124 (Utah 1982). Mr. Iverson made no showing of 
fraud in the trial court and cannot raise the issue for the first 
time on appeal. 
The references Mr. Iverson cites in his brief, "(record 
p. 2« 11. 10-16)", do not show any evidence whatsoever of fraud. 
Those references merely show that two subpoenas were issued and 
that the first was not served in time for the hearing. The first 
suDpoena was admittedly not served properly and for that reason a 
second suDpoena was served. 
In the Tax Commission's "Statement of Material Facts" 
found in the "Verified Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Affirmance", the undersigned counsel explained how the 
subpoenas were issued: 
Based upon the Verified Petition, and 
pursuant to its subpoena powers authorized by 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-46 (17) , the Tax 
Commission issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum on 
March 21, 1986 which did not include a set 
date for Mr. Iverson!s appearance. The Tax 
Commission, in other words, signed the 
subpoena without a date certain for 
appearance. The original date was then set 
for April 10, 1986 as noted by Mr. Iverson. 
However, the Tax Commission, at that time, 
did not know the whereabouts of Mr. Iverson 
and had not obtained personal service. When 
Mr. Iverson1s present address was 
subsequently discovered through Mr. Iversonfs 
former landlord, the date en the subpoena was 
changed to May 5, 1986 and personal service 
was obtained. Verified Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Affirmance at 2. 
The only change between: the first subpoena and the 
second was the date. Mr. Iverson was not personally served with 
the first subpoena, only the second. Mr. Iverson presented no 
authority to the district court nor this Court that the date 
change between the first and second subpoena constituted fraud or 
forgery, obviously because there is no such authority* The Tax 
Commission issued the subpoena without filling in the date for 
appearance because it did not know at the time when and if Mr* 
Iverson could be served. Changing the date for the convenience 
of all parties and to provide adequate notice does not deprive 
Mr. Iverson of any rights. In fact, it protects his right to due 
process under the law. As the district court pointed out, "Mr. 
Iverson acknowledged in open court his receipt of said subpoena." 
(R-19). Mr. Iverson's arguments of forgery are preposterous. 
Mr. .Iverson1s reliance upon United States v. Minker, 
350 U.S. 179 (195b), for the position that he cannot be compelled 
under subpoena to testify, is completely misplaced. The issue in 
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y.ir.ser was wnether section 234 of tne Immigration and nationality 
Actr 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) , empowered an immigration officer to 
subpoena a naturalized citizen who was the subject of an 
investigation, where the purpose of the investigation was to 
determine if oood cause existed for the institution of 
denaturalization proceedings. 
The purpose of summoning Kinker, as identified by the 
Supreme Court, was: 
to try to elicit information relating to the 
possible institution of proceedings seeking 
the revocation of [Kinker1s3 
naturalization. . . . Information so 
obtained might be used under some 
circumstances in court to take away Kinker's 
American citizenship or convict him of 
perjury or some other crime. 350 U.S. at 
195. 
In either case, Kinker faced a significant deprivation 
of his rights since (1) citizenship cannot be taken away without 
a judicial trial in which the government carries a heavy burden. 
Id. at 289; and (2) the Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination is extended to civil cases in which there is a 
threat of criminal sanction. Seer e.g. Affleck v. Third Judicial 
ni ?r.ri ci Court
 f_ 655 F.2d 665 (Utah 19S2). 
In this case, however, neither citizenship, nor risk of 
criminal sanction, nor any analogous interests, are at stake. 
Instead, Kr. Iverson was incarcerated for civil contempt, 
pursuant to Section 78-32-15. As stated in the Order to Show 
Cause, Kr. Iverson was ordered to appear before the court ro show 
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cause "why he shoulc not be adjudged guilty of conteir.pt and 
punished accordingly for failure to obey the Subpoena Duces Tecum 
. • . .
tt
 (R-15). The district court explained this to Mr. 
iversen: 
KR. IVERSON: . . . So the State Tax 
Commission through an adminstrative procedure 
has determined and found me guilty of a 
criminal penalty and assessed such penalty. 
For that reason I'm in fear of criminal 
charges and feel that any questioning 
concerning that puts me in a situation of 
self-incrimination. 
THE COURT: 
proceedinos 
sirr.rly to e 
That' 
before 
nforce 
s not 
us. 
the su 
the 
Tr;e 
bpoer. 
nature 
proceed 
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State Tax Commission, (R-55) . (Empnasis 
added.) 
Elsewhere the court stated: 
If that's the case, [that Mr. Iverson is not 
a taxpayer] what's the difficulty with you 
coming forward and answering their questions 
and giving the information? Why are you 
playing the game and going around the bush 15 
times? If you've got a rich granddad or 
someone that truly gives you a gift t:,at 
allows you to sustain yourself, gifts are 
recognized under the law. But if you are 
exchanging services or trading services, then 
under the tax laws, that's income, and you 
make a mockery of the process . . • (R-6S). 
The court continued: 
You are not a criminal defendant. It's not 
the traditional burden upon the State to 
prove each and every element of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt, which you seem to 
want. Ke have a voluntary tax system that 
works because citizens understand that they 
have certain obligations, and one is that ycu 
file tax returns and in this case you haven't 
filed returns, so the Commission simply 
exercises its subpoena powers to get 
information from you concerning those facts. 
(R-70) . 
In sum, Mr. Iverson did not face criminal charges and 
did not face deportation as did Minker. Since those facts in 
KinKe.r were dispositive of that case and the Supreme Court's 
noldinc, the absence of similar facts in this case makes Minker 
totally irrelevant. Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court in Mayers 
v, gror.son. 100 Utah 279, 114 P.2d 213 (1542), the very case upon 
which Mr- Iverson relied to stay the district court order and 
obtain a release from jail pendinc appeal, is direct authority 
against him. 
The first issue in Mayers was "Did the [Tax] Commission 
have power to subpoena Mayers[,3" who was the executor of an 
estate allegedly subject to the Utah inheritance tax. id. at 
290. Mayers wrote the Tax Commission claiming that it bad no 
power to issue the subpoena. Eoth the district court and this 
Court disagreed. Citing the Revised Statutes of Utah § 104-14-15 
(1SJ3) (the predecessor to section 59-5-46(17) (1953), as 
amended) this Court stated that: 
Tne words "and to summon witnesses to appear 
and give testimony and to produce records, 
books, papers, and documents relating to any 
Latter which the tax commission has authority 
to investigate or determine,w (Italics added) 
should be considered as meaning what they say 
and as intended to assist in effectuating the 
totel power to "administer and supervise the. 
tax laws of the State" of Utah . . . I£. 
(emphasis added). 
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The Mayers Court likewise held that the district court 
had jurisdiction to entertain the Tax Commission's petition and 
to hold the executor in contempt for his refusal to honor the Tax 
Commission subpoena. In fact, that proposition appeared so 
elementary that: 
It [the taxpayer] did not challenge the 
jurisdiction of the lower court to entertain 
the petition of the Tax Commission, as it 
well could not- I£. at 289, 
Mr- Iverson's third argument under Point II of his 
brief is that the Tax Commission subpoena is invalid because it 
compelled his appearance outside the county of his residence. 
This, it is argued, violates Rule 45d(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure which provides: 
(2) A resident of the state may be required 
to attend an examination only in the county 
wherein he resides or is employed or 
transacts his business in person . . . 
The answer to that argument is that the Tax Commission 
is not governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure since it is 
not a court. Rule A12-01-l:6b of the Rules of Administrative 
Procedure provides that: 
Because of the policy of the Commission 
favoring full disclosure, the discovery 
devices set forth in Part V of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and utilized in civil 
litigation will generally be neither 
necessary nor appropriate in connection with 
adjudication before the Tax Commission. 
The ."Rules of Administrative Procedure then continue to 
describe discovery procedures dramatically different than those 
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allowed under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, gee e»c. Rules 
A12-01-1:6c(1) and (2). Likewise the Tax Commission's rules of 
evidence do not track the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Rule Al'2-
01-1:7. Rule Al2-01-l:5i, the only Tax Commission rule governing 
the subpoena power, provides in part that: 
Service of the subpoena will be made by the 
sheriff of the county in which service is 
made or his agent, or by a duly appoints 
representative of the Tax Commission and, in 
all other respects, as provided by law. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In this case, the Subpoena Duces Tecum was served by 
Mr. Sterling Pritchett, a special agent for the Tax Commission, 
on Rachelle Iverson, pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the only Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
controlling on the Tax Commission's service of process. (R-ll). 
The Tax Commission's promulgation of its own rules does 
net imply that the agency has either less or more power than the 
courts, as Mr. Iverson implies. Instead, administrative rules 
are promulgated to recognize the unique functions of the agency. 
Moreover, such rules cannot be adopted without public comment 
pursuant to the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act, Utah Code 
Ann
 r § 63-46-1 (1953), as amended. 
Point III 
ThP District Court had Jurisdiction to Hold Mr. Iverson in 
Cor.r^pt for Failure to Honor the Tax Commission Subpoena,, 
Mr. .Iverson!s final argument is that the "Tax Court" 
(as opposed to a district court) is not empowered to hold him in 
_o o_ 
ccnterr.pt because the Tax Court Act, Section 59-24-1 through S 
grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Tax Court under three 
conditions: 
1. There must have been a decision rendered by the 
State Tax Commission. 
2. That decision must have been rendered after formal 
hearings beforetthe Tax Commission. 
3. An appeal from cr a petition for review cf that 
decision so rendered must be brought to the Tax Court. 
From those premises, Mr. Iverson concludes that the Tax 
Court had no jurisdiction because he was given no hearing. This 
argument,, like the others, is. specious. 
The Tax" Court is, as specifically noted in the Tax 
Court Act, a division of the "district courts". While the Tax 
Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Tax 
Commission, it does not thereby shed its status as a district 
court. Exclusive jurisdiction to hear tax appeals does not mean 
an absence of jurisdiction to hear anything else. 
In this case,, the Order to Show Cause was brought in 
the Tax Court Division of the Third Judicial District Court 
because the Tax Commission was asking the court to enforce one of 
its orders, namely a Subpoena Duces Tecum, which Mr. Iverson had 
ignored. This procedure was specifically sanctioned in Mayers v. 
Branson. In application of those powers to the facts before it, 
the district court found that: 
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Clay K. Iverson is in contempt for failure to 
obey the Subpoena Duces Tecum properly issued 
by the Utah State Tax Commissiont;3 and 
further that Clay K. Iverson1s arguments and 
defenses raised in opposition to said 
Subpoena Duces Tecum and this Court1s 
iurisdiction are frivolous and without merit. 
"(R-20). 
CONCLUSION 
The summation offered at the district court is an 
appropriate conclusion to this brief: 
I think the evidence shows a history of long-
suffering and patience with Mr. Iverson, and 
demonstrates a man" who is utterly 
contemptuous of any lawful or judicial 
procedure that is not to his particular 
liking. If there ever was an individual who 
is in utter contempt of the law and the 
powers of the Tax Commission of this court-, 
it is Mr. Iverson, and I strongly urge and 
ask the Court to exercise its full powers 
under the statute and incarcerate him in the 
Salt Lake County Jail for 30 days. (R-68) 
The district court should be affirmed. 
DATED this day of October, 1986, 
h&X^ELL *A. MILLER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax a Business Regulations Div, 
Attorney for State of Utah and 
Utah State Tax Commission 
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